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Sturm. 1 Introduction
No matter whether an instrument or a targeting rule is used, monetary
policy makers are concerned about the short-run future development of e.g.
inﬂationary expectations and/or the expected output gap. The forward
looking nature of monetary policy is widely acknowledged in theory (see
Walsh, 2003), but still creating problems in empirical analysis. In most of
the nowadays popular time-series studies (see Christiano, et al., 1999) it has
become apparent that it is hard to use reliable indicators of expected output
and price developments. As Orphanides (2001) argues, the use of e.g. real-
time output data can change for instance the role and interpretation of a
Taylor rule in the U.S. case.1 In this paper we present a double answer to the
forward looking problem problem. We will use a business cycle indicator as a
proxy to measure current real economic activity. Moreover, we will use asset
prices as indicators of expectations of all future economic variables. The goal
of the paper is twofold. First, we want to illustrate that misspeciﬁcation
issues are less likely to occur if one takes these kind of forward looking
variables into account. Secondly, we will show that central banks do indeed
respond to information embedded in these forward-looking variables. This
sheds some new light on the interpretation of monetary policy.
In the end the eﬀectiveness of monetary transmission, by whatever chan-
nel, depends on the rigidity of prices and wages and on the transmission into
real expenditure categories. Traditionally, the so-called interest rate channel
is held responsible for transmission of monetary policy shocks. Nowadays
the working of the whole ﬁnancial system is believed to be relevant. Due to
informational problems the credit market has a special role in propagating
monetary shocks (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). But revaluation of all
assets and liabilities (resulting in net wealth positions) seems to determine
the ultimate impact. The ﬁnancial structure, like described by Tobin in
his general equilibrium view on the ﬁnancial sector (see e.g. Brainard and
Tobin, 1968), is crucial in transmission (see also the ﬁnancial accelerator
approach by Bernanke et al., 1999).
As Lettau et al. (2002) show for the US, equity, housing, and liquidity
are considered to be the three key ﬁnancial markets in transmission (apart
from the money and credit markets). Liquidity in various forms is essential
to consumption and investment decisions (but we will not elaborate on this
well-developed literature here). Lettau et al. argue that the housing market
is central in monetary transmission. An interest rate increase will increase
the costs of mortgages. The fall in demand for housing will reduce the
collateral value of existing houses, lower borrowing capacity for its owners
and so start a downturn in a credit cycle (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1999).
1Adema (2003) on the other hand illustrates that this problem is less relevant for the
euro area, because the European Central Banks focuses more on the control of inﬂation.
2The direct wealth eﬀects of housing market crashes are well known and by
far more substantial than any other revaluation eﬀect. Equity markets on
the other hand have a leading role in expected future growth and inﬂation
forecasting. The informational contents of equity is relevant to forward-
looking decisions. As Bernanke (2003) argues monetary economists need
to understand how strong monetary policy changes aﬀect equity prices (the
equity price-interest rate elasticity is believed to be about 3 to 6 for the US)
and more important, why equity prices are inﬂuenced. With this knowledge
one can analyze transmission of asset price changes into real decisions and
infer consequences for monetary policy.
Asset prices contain more information than any other economic variable:
e.g. equity prices are believed to signal future business cycle developments.
Until the last recession in 2001 in the U.S., the SP-500 has shown to be a
leading indicator of GDP-growth. This leading property of asset prices has
two major consequences. First, monetary authorities will use asset price
information to derive inﬂationary and output gap expectations. The Bun-
desbank was believed to pursue a monetary strategy focused on inﬂation
(see Bernanke and Mihov, 1997), so would have been eager to follow asset
price inﬂation. Secondly, private agents will use the information embedded
in asset prices (or revaluations) into their decision making process. So the
leading informational contents of asset prices might change our view on the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. If we observe that central banks care about
expectations, we should also incorporate growth expectations. Are central
bankers interested in lagged real growth or output gaps in steering monetary
policy or do they take care of expected business cycle developments? We
advocate the latter in this paper and combine the role of the role of asset
prices and expected output developments. It is most likely that business
cycle indicators will not be determined by asset price bubbles (like in 2001
in the U.S.) and will therefore be valuable contributors in our analysis.
We take Germany as an example, because of two main reasons. First
of all, the German ﬁnancial system and the role of the housing market are
special. Germany is known for being a bank-based economy (see e.g. Kakes
and Sturm, 2002). This leads to the expectation that housing price trans-
mission maybe important. With the Netherlands, Germany has the highest
share of mortgage loans to GDP in the EU. This could lead to vulnerability
to interest rate shocks. Moreover, the term of the mortgage contracts is
typically long (25 to 30 years, as in Austria and The Netherlands). On the
other hand the owner occupation rate in Germany is relatively low (40 per-
cent, while 63 for the EU) while the private rental occupation rate is high.
So it remains an empirical problem to establish the precise impact of house
prices. Secondly, we take Germany as an example since it has a consistent
historical experience in using business cycle indicators. We turn back to this
issue later on in discussing the data we use.
There are several interesting issues to be addressed. First, how is the
3monetary transmission mechanism aﬀected by asset prices? Does neglecting
asset price developments lead to the ’wrong’ conclusions with respect to
output and inﬂation-sensitivity to monetary policy changes? Secondly, how
big is the impact of asset price shocks on GDP? How should we cope with a
contemporaneous measurement of GDP, knowing that oﬃcial publication of
GDP lags at least one year? And thirdly, did monetary authorities respond
to asset price changes in the past? We don’t go into the problem how central
banks should respond to asset price changes. The latter problem requires
the speciﬁcation of a social welfare function, which is out of scope of this
paper.
In the next section we very shortly describe the theoretical context of our
study. Our main argument in Section 2 is that it is generally believed that
positive asset price shocks should stimulate real expenditure. In Section 3
we very brieﬂy compare the German housing and equity markets to those
in France, Italy, Japan, the UK and US. We show that housing is relatively
important in Germany. We proceed in Section 4 by reviewing the literature
on Vector AutoRegression (VAR) models. We describe the methodology, the
major results on monetary policy identiﬁcation, and VAR-models that focus
on Germany and/or asset prices. Next we specify a basic VAR model of the
German economy. We show that including the IFO-indicator instead of real
GDP growth in the base model leads to a more interesting interpretation
of monetary policy. Next we show that including asset prices also provides
a richer view. We compare the major ﬁndings of the models in terms of
structural factorizations of impulse response functions and variance decom-
positions of the interest rate equation (which we assume to be the monetary
policy rule). In Section 6 we summarize and conclude.
2 Theory
The literature on the theory of monetary transmission and monetary policy
rules is enormous (see Walsh, 2003). For our paper two strands of this
literature are relevant. First, the role of the measurement of real activity.
Secondly, the role of asset prices. In the discussion on monetary policy
rules measurement of expected real activity is one of the recent issues of
debate. Orphanides (2001) discusses the role of so-called real-time indicators
of output gaps and concludes for the U.S. that using real-time data matters
in designing rules. Sauer and Sturm (2003) and Adema (2003) do not ﬁnd
that the use of real-time data matters to the ECB’s monetary policy design.
In general though, the literature is convinced of the forward-looking nature
of monetary policy (see Clarida and Gertler, 1997). So including more timely
measures of output or output gaps is necessary in designing rules.
Our second theoretical item, the role of asset prices in monetary trans-
mission, deserves a little more attention. We discuss the role of asset prices
4in general, and house and equity prices in particular. Housing and equity
diﬀer in two important aspects. First, housing provides direct consumer
services and enters the utility function (see e.g. Aoki et al., 2002). Second,
price changes of housing can be observed less frequently. This implies that
the informational content of housing prices is typically less than the one
carried by equity.
Standard classical monetary theory focuses on the interest rate channel.
In the tradition of Wicksell (1907), a lower banking rate (below the natural
rate of interest) has an impact on spending (investment in particular) which
will lead to higher output if prices are sticky. Starting with Bernanke and
Blinder (1988), the credit channel has become an important second line
of transmission. Information asymmetries in the credit market will lead
to equilibrium rationing and so transmit initial monetary shocks via credit
to output. In the same spirit Bernanke and Gertler (1995) extended the
credit channel to a credit view by allowing the so-called ﬁnancial accelerator:
revaluation of assets aﬀects spending.
How should we treat asset price changes in this respect? First, since asset
prices reﬂect expected discounted future payoﬀ streams, an adjustment of
a (stochastic) discount factor will lead to a revaluation. To what extent
precisely monetary policy changes aﬀect these stochastic discount factors
(are risk premia embedded?) is unknown, but a positive shock to money
market rates is likely to have a negative direct revaluation of assets. If asset
prices change, how will this inﬂuence real expenditure? Here we can think
of four basic mechanisms (see Chirinko et al., 2003).
First, there is the classical Modigliani life-cycle model, which leads to the
wealth channel. Higher asset values will increase lifetime wealth and there-
fore positively aﬀect e.g. private consumption. It is an empirical matter to
what extent various assets will (temporarily) aﬀect lifetime wealth. Equity
price changes might be transitory and interpreted in this way, while house
price changes for instance might be considered to be more permanent (or
sticky at least). Moreover, an asset like housing provides direct consumer
services and enters a utility function (see e.g. Aoki et al., 2002). If asset
components and consumption are substitutes, an increase in e.g. housing
wealth might lead to substitution out of consumption. So the wealth chan-
nel is not completely clear about the impact of asset price changes on real
expenditure.
Secondly, in relation to the ﬁnancial accelerator, we have the balance
sheet channel. Both consumers and ﬁrms can be exposed to ﬁnancing con-
straints, due to informational problems. If external ﬁnance is more expensive
than internal sources of ﬁnance it is likely that ﬁnancial structure of house-
holds or ﬁrms is relevant. Positive revaluation of assets can alleviate these
constraints (see Hubbard, 1998).
Third, positive shocks to e.g. equity prices might lower the equity ﬁnanc-
ing costs (and to some extent the same argument holds for housing). If the
5current equity price falls below the fundamental value, equity ﬁnancing gets
cheap. This so-called equity-ﬁnancing channel might not lead to a positive
impact on real expenditure, if managers use the proceeds from emissions to
invest in ﬁnancial transactions. So the sign of the equity channel is not clear
a priori.
Fourth, in the spirit of Brainard and Tobin (1968) there might be an
allocation channel. If there is an initial shock to some asset price, imperfect
substitutable assets will be exchanged, leading to revaluation of other assets.
It will be hard to align market and fundamental values, which might lead to
misallocation. This misallocation might even stretch out to real investment.
The bottomline of these four channels is that it is likely that there will
be positive impact of a policy interest rate decrease, but there is no absolute
guarantee. It remains an empirical issue to what extent asset price changes
will aﬀect real expenditure.
3 The German equity and housing markets in a
birds-eye view
The German ﬁnancial system is diﬀerent from its U.K. and U.S. equivalents
(see Allen and Gale, 2000). We don’t discuss this general feature in detail,
but provide Table 1 with some basic key indicators for France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the U.K. and U.S. (from the World Bank source on Finan-
cial Structure Indicators). We can observe the relative overhang to bank
loans in Germany opposed to the more equity markets based Anglo-Saxon
economies. Knowing this general feature of the German ﬁnancial system, we
provide some more detail on housing and equity markets. Table 2 provides
information of the relative shares of equity and housing values in a subset of
the countries (using our database EUROMON, produced by De Nederland-
sche Bank). Here we see that housing wealth is relatively large in Germany.
Equity markets are relatively larger by this measure in the UK and US (as
one would expect from Table 1). The wealth components are computed
from the capital stock of the corporate sector and the general stock price
index for the equity variable and the stock of owner occupied houses and
the general housing price index for the housing variable. From Table 2 we
conclude that the role of the housing market is relatively important in the
German case.
For both markets it is interesting to know more about ownership, because
ownership is relevant to the eﬀectiveness of transmission. For the equity
market it is hard to get an idea of the ownership structure though. La
Porta et al. (1999) provide information on the ownership of listed ﬁrms for
both medium-sized and large publicly traded ﬁrms. We give the data for
the six economies of interest in Table 3. From this table it can be seen that
German is not that publicly owned as in market-based economies. Medium-
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France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 80.9 93.6 53.1 102.4 79.1 64.3
Concentration of banks 34.5 38.6 30.6 18.3 45.0 21.1
Net Interest Margin 3.3 2.9 3.9 2.0 2.3 4.4
Stock market capitalization to GDP 22.6 19.1 13.6 68.0 82.6 64.9
Stock market total value traded to GDP 11.1 18.3 6.5 34.7 38.0 46.0
Stock market turnover ratio 39.7 85.7 38.8 48.6 40.3 62.8
Private bond market capitalization to GDP 42.5 48.1 30.4 43.2 16.6 79.5
Public bond market capitalization to GDP 32.7 22.9 91.2 52.3 30.2 56.1
Source: World Bank web-page:
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/ﬁnstructure/index.htm Financial
Structure Indicators, averages over 1978-1998.
Table 2: Housing and equity wealth indicators (percentages of GDP)
France Germany Italy Japan U.K. Japan
Housing 377.0 686.4 514.9 309.1 407.0 426.4
Equity 529.9 532.1 547.5 374.3 602.4 616.4
Source: EUROMON Database, De Nederlandsche Bank. The housing wealth is
computed as the rebuilding value of the stock of private owner occupied houses
(assuming a lifetime of 50 years). The equity wealth is computed as the value
(traded and non-traded) of the capital stock (not owned by debt-holders). Here
we assume an annual depreciation of 6 percent per year. The ﬁgures are averages
over 1978-2000.
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France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
Medium-sized ﬁrms
Widely held 0 0.1 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Family 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1
State 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0
Widely held ﬁnancial 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0
Widely held corporate 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0.1 0 0.3 0.6 0 0
Large publicly traded ﬁrms
Widely held 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.9 1 0.8
Family 0.2 0.1 0.15 0.05 0 0.2
State 0.15 0.25 0.4 0.05 0 0
Widely held ﬁnancial 0.05 0.15 0.05 0 0 0
Widely held corporate 0 0 0.1 0 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0.1 0 0 0
Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
sized ﬁrms are owned by controlling families. Large ﬁrms are relatively more
owned by ﬁnancial institutions and the government.
Finally, we provide some institutional data on the housing market (see
Giuliodori, 2003) in Table 4. We provide information on the ownership
structure in the upper panel. We can observe that relatively few houses are
occupied by owners in Germany and more rental activity is observed. In
principle this will complicate a housing price channel, but it is not said that
house-owners will not transmit revaluation into rental tariﬀs. In the lower
panel we give some mortgage system information. Germany has a relatively
large fraction of mortgage loans, the contracts are typically longer, but the
mortgage loan costs are comparable to the foreign equivalents.
4 Literature on Vector Autoregression Models
In this section we review the relevant literature on Vector Autoregression
(VAR) models. We start with a discussion of the most important con-
tributions in this ﬁeld. Next we discuss how monetary policy shocks are
identiﬁed in VAR-models, and review the role of asset prices. Finally we
give an overview of VAR-models of the German economy.
8Table 4: House market indicators
Variable France Germany Italy U.K.
Housing tenure structure
Owner occupation rate 54 40 75 67
Social rental occupation rate 21 20 3 23
Private rental occupation rate 17 40 22 10
Other 8 0 0 0
Mortgage systems
Residential mortgages/GDP 21 51 7 57
Typical term 17.5 27.5 10 25
Typical Loan-to-Value ratio 75 70 50 92.5
Transaction costs 7.5 7.1 7.4 1.5
Source: Giuliodori (2003).
4.1 The history of VAR-methodology
Vector autoregressions have become an important tool since Sims (1980) crit-
icized large-scale macroeconometric models for assuming unfounded identi-
fying restrictions. One of the main issues in the analysis of properties of
vector autoregressions is the (use of theory in order to come to) identiﬁca-
tion of so-called structural shocks. Sims suggested solving the identiﬁcation
of the contemporaneous structure of the model by using a recursive (orthog-
onalized) structure. This implies that there is no contemporaneous feedback
from the variables mentioned at the end of the ordering on the variables on
top. Although theory can play a role in such a recursive scheme, the lack of
simultaneity led Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986), and Sims
(1986) to propose a larger role for economic theory in formulating plausible
restrictions on contemporaneous interactions among variables. This implies
that the recursivity can be replaced by other more simultaneous structures
(at least conserving the number of identifying restrictions). This class of
models is labelled Structural VAR (SVAR) models. Blanchard and Quah
(1989) and Gali (1992) suggested to impose so-called long-run restrictions on
impulse response functions to allow for instance for inﬂation not to have an
impact on output. But, as Faust and Leeper (1997) argue, imposing long-
run restrictions of this type requires the VAR to satisfy strong dynamic
restrictions.
Pesaran and Shin (1998) criticized the orthogonal impulse-response anal-
ysis (Cholesky-decomposition) and advocated to use so-called generalized
impulse-response analysis. These generalized impulse responses from an in-
novation to the jth variable are generated by applying a variable speciﬁc
Cholesky factor computed with the jth variable at the top of the ordering.
These impulses therefore do not depend on the initial ordering of the vari-
9ables. A major disadvantage of the generalized impulse response analysis
is that the results are completely a-theoretical and lack any obvious inter-
pretation. The major advantage is that the shock patterns observed appeal
more to historical data and covariations.
Following the Granger representation theorem vector autoregressions can
easily be transformed into a so-called Vector Error Correction model (see
Garratt et al., 2003). In a VECM apart from the standard lagged diﬀer-
enced dependent vectors, stationary linear combinations of the levels of the
variables are added. These cointegrating vectors describe the long-run equi-
librium of the model. It is obvious that economic theory is needed to identify
these long-run vectors. Garratt et al. show that it is possible, at least in
principle, to combine long-run VECM restrictions and short-run theoretical
restrictions in the so-called SVAR.
There is a debate on the use of cointegrating relations in VAR-models. As
Sims et al. (1990) showed, a VAR model of I(1)-variables can be estimated
unrestricted (at least asymptotically) if there are suﬃcient cointegrated re-
lations. Estimating a VECM with ill-speciﬁed (or arbitrarily chosen) long-
run vectors will lead to biased impulse-response functions. Estimating the
VAR in ﬁrst-diﬀerenced stationary variables leads to a loss of information
though. So the ﬁnal choice between a model in I(1)- or I(0)-form depends
on making the rather subjective trade-oﬀ between a loss of information using
I(0)-variables versus the chance of including meaningless long-run vectors.
4.2 Identifying monetary policy shocks
Identifying monetary policy shocks using times series information is not
straightforward. One could simply observe the actions of monetary policy
makers (e.g. policy interest rate increases), but policy makers respond to
non-monetary developments. If the demand for goods increases and supply
is ﬁxed (as will be likely in the short run), an interest rate increase will
reﬂect this demand change and not so much a monetary contraction. So
one needs to know the structure of the economy in order to understand and
interpret monetary shocks.
As Christiano et al. (1999) argue the literature explores three general
strategies to isolate monetary policy shocks. The ﬁrst uses economic iden-
tiﬁcation to estimate central banks’ feedback rules. Here one assumes that
the monetary policy instrument, e.g. the policy interest rate, is well known
and accepted, that the contemporaneous determinants of this policy rate
are known, and that the dynamics of interaction between the policy rate
and the other variables can be traced. One can directly estimate a forward-
looking monetary policy reaction function, like Rudebusch (1998) does for a
Taylor-rule, or estimate a prototype VAR. Identiﬁcation of monetary policy
shocks can be performed by assuming orthogonalized shocks or by impos-
ing structure in a SVAR (see Sims and Zha, 1995, or Bernanke and Mihov,
101998). A second way to identify monetary policy shocks is to look at data
like board meetings to try to distillate policy shocks (see Romer and Romer,
1989). A third method to identify shocks is to assume that they don’t aﬀect
real variables in the long run (see Gali, 1992). As explained above, this ap-
proach has been criticized. In long-run models, like VECM’s, no attention
to monetary shocks is given.
There are numerous VAR-studies on monetary transmission. The ba-
sic interest in VAR-models indeed originated from the interest in mone-
tary transmission and the Lucas-critique on large-scale structural modeling
(all the references given above apply to this ﬁeld). As Christiano et al.
(1999) argue the models can be classiﬁed according to the speciﬁcation of
the monetary reaction function. Central banks can focus on monetary aggre-
gates (M2, M3), interbank aggregates (like (non)-borrowed or total reserves,
see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998), interest rates (like the Taylor-rule, Taylor,
1993) or even on the interaction between interest and exchange rates (see
for instance Kim and Roubini, 2000, Cushman and Zha, 1997, and Clarida
and Gertler, 1997).
In general terms one can argue that misspeciﬁcation is a common theme
in VAR-models. Misspeciﬁcation can originate from a wrong interpretation
of the art of monetary policy to the lack of including relevant variables.
One of the common features of monetary VAR-models is the so-called price
puzzle. In lots of postwar business cycles a rise in inﬂation was preceded by
an increase in interest rates and commodity prices (see Eichenbaum, 1992).
Leaving commodity prices out or ignoring indicators of future inﬂation leads
to substantial price puzzles in numerous VAR-models. Barth and Ramey
(2000) argue that the cost channel may be an important part of the monetary
transmission mechanism. They argue that if working capital is an essential
component of production and distribution, monetary contractions can aﬀect
output through a supply channel as well as the traditional demand-type
channels. An increase in the interest rate will increase production costs and
lower output. So, generally spoken, modern VAR-studies are not so much
troubled by the price puzzle (after controlling for other demand and supply
shocks).
4.3 VAR-models and asset prices
Both VAR models and Equilibrium Business Cycle models report substan-
tial asset price (wealth) eﬀects. For instance Lettau et al. (2002) report a
strong wealth eﬀect on consumption in the US using an SVAR-model. The
IMF (2002) reports a robust international wealth eﬀect, especially via equity
prices in market-based economies. Bernanke et al. (1999) present a theo-
retical model that includes a so-called ﬁnancial accelerator that can support
the empirical ﬁndings. This model is extended with an equity market in
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), while Aoki et al. (2002) include a housing
11market.
Besides the broad establishment of wealth eﬀects there is a lively debate
on the role of asset prices in monetary policy. The general notion in favour
of including asset price ﬂuctuations in monetary policy rules is that an asset
price bubble is socially unwanted. The disruptive eﬀects of the bursting of
the bubble lead to real eﬀects of various kinds (economic growth, investment,
income distribution, soundness of the ﬁnancial system), which should be
avoided by a central bank. There are disadvantages of using monetary policy
in trying to avoid bubbles though. As Dornbusch (1999) argues there are
two major disadvantages. First, there is a tendency towards an asymmetric
response to asset price changes. A sudden widespread slump in assets prices
will lead to a large provision of liquidity. A central bank is concerned about
trust in the ﬁnancial system and wants to provide stability. An asset price
boom should then lead to an increase in interest rates, but the general
public will typically not appreciate this. Knowing the likely reaction of
central banks, there will be a moral hazard problem that leads to overly
risky investment, possibly creating a bubble. Secondly, the credibility of a
central bank might be lowered. Asset prices are volatile and typically hard
to predict. Responding on a day-to-day basis may reduce credibility.
The following items seem to be relevant is this discussion:
1. Should measures of the general price level include asset prices?
2. Should there be target levels for asset prices?
3. Should asset prices be included as indicators in a direct inﬂation strat-
egy?
4. Should monetary policy makers react stronger to asset prices than
item 3 prescribes?
The majority of opinions says no to the ﬁrst two items. It is very hard
to estimate the true value of individual stock for instance, so how could
a central bank be able to value all assets appropriately? In the System
of National Accounts it is common to measure price indices based on ﬂow
transactions in goods. Including prices of stocks of assets would blur this
approach. Moreover, one could argue that if asset prices were relevant,
they would be leading indicators in decisions. Moreover they can be leading
indicators without being included in the indicators of the current general
price level.
The empirical research on the third and fourth item can be divided into
two competing views. On the one hand, papers by Bernanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001) argue that a central bank should not respond to asset price
ﬂuctuations. On the other hand, Cecchetti et al. (2002) and Filardo (2001)
come to the opposite conclusion. Bernanke and Gertler analyze the role of
an exogenously determined ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting rule in a sophisticated
12dynamic new-Keynesian model with credit market frictions. Their main idea
is that if asset price changes are important they should translate into changes
in expected inﬂation and via that channel have their impact on monetary
policy. A central bank should not try to target asset prices. Cecchetti et
al. argue that one should use an optimal monetary policy rule that takes
into account all information. Ignoring asset price changes will lead to sub-
optimal outcomes. But a central bank should be able to distinguish asset
price bubbles in the Cecchetti et al. model. Filardo (2001) argues that
a central bank should respond to asset price movements as long as they
provide some information about inﬂation or output, even if the prices are
driven by bubbles or not. It should be clear though in the Filardo-model
how asset price ﬂuctuations aﬀect real variables. If this is not clear, the
expected costs of responding to asset price changes might be too high.
So both wealth eﬀects and monetary policy reactions to asset price
changes are found to be relevant and could possibly lead to better spec-
iﬁcations of VAR-models. In principle three assets are used in empirical
studies: equity, housing, and liquidity. We don’t focus on liquidity here, but
review some of the results found for equity transmission and housing market
studies.
Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) analyze the impact of wealth on consump-
tion. Using a VAR-model they ﬁnd that there is a contemporaneous impact
from wealth on consumption. Lettau et al. (2002) construct an SVAR for
the US and include household asset wealth in a consumption model. They
conclude that the impact of shocks to the Federal Funds Rate via wealth
components is not so strong, but direct interest rate eﬀects are. Asset val-
ues can be inﬂuenced by other sources (like price increases or upturn of the
business cycle) and can be ampliﬁed into consumption.
Lastrapes (2002) estimates the dynamic response of aggregate owner-
occupied housing prices to money supply shocks and interprets these re-
sponses using a dynamic equilibrium model of the housing market that relies
on the asset view of housing demand. Money supply shocks are identiﬁed
empirically from a vector autoregression. Using monthly data, he ﬁnds that
money shocks have real eﬀects on the housing market: both real housing
prices and housing sales (new starts and existing homes) rise in the short-
run in response to positive shocks to the money supply. Giuliodori (2003)
gives an extensive overview of the role of house prices in the Euro-countries.
He estimates SVAR-models for several countries (Belgium, Finland, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and links the results
to facts of ﬁnancial structure (like Cecchetti, 1999). Giuliodori includes in-
ﬂation, GDP, real house prices, the interest rate and the exchange rate as
the key variables. Iacoviello (2000) estimates VAR- models for six European
economies to explain house price movements. He ﬁnds a substantial impact
of monetary policy on house prices. Using a sample of France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) Iacoviello speciﬁes a ﬁve-dimensional
13VAR with output, real house prices, real money, a short-term interest rate
and inﬂation. He ﬁnds that a contractionary monetary policy has a negative
impact on real house prices (to a similar extent as output), especially in the
UK and Italy (while moderate eﬀects appear for Germany).
There are not so many VAR-studies that include equity prices. Goodhart
and Hofmann (2001) is an exception. They assess the role of asset prices as
information variables for aggregate demand conditions and in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy. By looking at reduced form coeﬃcient estimates
and VAR impulse responses Goodhart and Hofmann derive Financial Con-
ditions Indices, weighted averages of the short-term real interest rate, the
eﬀective real exchange rate, real property and real share prices, for the G7
countries. They ﬁnd that house and share prices get a substantial weight
in such an index and that the derived Financial Conditions Indices con-
tain useful information about future inﬂationary pressures. Elbourne and
Salomons (2003) estimate an 8-variable VAR for developed economies and
ﬁnd no substantial equity wealth eﬀects (except for the UK and Japan).
4.4 VAR-models of Germany
Many VAR-models for Germany have been developed. We limit ourselves
here to review SVAR-models and models that focus on monetary trans-
mission. In an early study Weber (1996) analyzes the determinants of the
post-uniﬁcation downturn in Germany using an SVAR-model. The results
suggest that German business cycles were not all alike. Whilst adverse sup-
ply shocks clearly matter before uniﬁcation, it is primarily adverse aggregate
demand shocks and a too tight monetary policy, which dominate the Ger-
man post-uniﬁcation decline in output growth rates. Bernanke and Mihov
(1997) apply a structural VAR to determine the historical optimal indicator
of German monetary policy and ﬁnd that the Lombard rate has historically
been a good policy indicator. Peersman (2002) estimates an SVAR-model
that links short and long run interest rates in Germany. He ﬁnds a positive
correlation after a supply and demand shock and a negative correlation after
a monetary policy shock. Kakes and Sturm (2002) analyze monetary pol-
icy transmission according to the credit channel by assuming heterogeneity
between banks. Banks hold important positions in the German economy,
which justiﬁes such an approach.
There have been a number of VAR-studies on the EU-level that include
the German case. In the Monetary Transmission Network of the European
Central Bank Mojon and Peersman (2003) review VAR-models for 10 EU-
countries. They classify the countries according to their monetary integra-
tion with Germany. Apart form the ﬁrst class, Germany itself, there are
core- Germany countries, like the Netherlands or Austria, and other EU-
countries. Mojon and Peersman ﬁnd output eﬀects from a tighter monetary
policy, falling prices and a rather common pattern across countries. Peers-
14man and Smets (2001) estimate an area-wide identiﬁed VAR for the euro
area. They ﬁnd for the EU similar eﬀects as have been found in the analy-
sis of US monetary policy. On the G-7 level Canova and De Nicolo (2002)
examine the importance of monetary disturbances for cyclical ﬂuctuations
in real activity and inﬂation. They employ a novel identiﬁcation approach,
which uses the sign of the cross-correlation function in response to shocks to
assign a structural interpretation to orthogonal innovations. They ﬁnd that
identiﬁed monetary shocks signiﬁcantly contribute to output and inﬂation
cycles in all G-7 countries.
5 Vector Autoregression
In this section we present our diﬀerent Vector AutoRegressions (VARs).
We ﬁrst construct a basic VAR model, including output, prices, credit, the
exchange rate and the interest rate as the key endogenous variables. Next we
switch output for the IFO business climate indicator and add asset prices to
illustrate their contribution. Overall, we follow the same methodology in the
models. We estimate the VAR models using quarterly data from 1978.4 to
1989.4 and 1992.1 to 1998.4. So we exclude the German reuniﬁcation period
and end our sample at the start of the European Central Bank. We estimate
Structural VAR (SVAR)-models in all cases. We focus on the interpretation
of the Impuls-Response Functions as far as the impact of interest rate and
asset prices shocks and variance-decompositions of the interest rate residuals
concerning monetary policy. Data are taken from the EUROMON-source,
produced by the Dutch central bank (see for a description of the data the
appendix).
5.1 A basic VAR-model
First we estimate a basic ﬁve-variable VAR-model of the German economy
for the 1978.4- 1998.4 sample (excluding the reuniﬁcation period 1990.1-
1991.4). This period covers the basic EMS-period. This VAR model in-
cludes reference series like GDP (Y ), the CPI (P), real domestic credit to
the private sector (CR, as the indicator of monetary stance), the nominal
trade weighted exchange rate (E), and the short-term money market in-
terest rate (RS). We use the latter variable as the indicator of monetary
policy. Identiﬁed shocks to the interest rate will be interpreted as monetary
policy changes. Oﬃcially, this might not have been the monetary strategy
of the Bundesbank, but de facto interest rate was used in the EMS-period
as monetary policy variable (see also Bernanke and Mihov, 1997).
The dependent vector is [Y,P,CR,E,RS]. All variables are in logs. We
tested for stationarity of the series using a larger sample available in the
data set: 1970.1-2000.4. Most series are found to be of order I(1), although
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of the price level is a borderline case (see Table
15Table 5: Unit root test results
Levels Diﬀerences
Variable ADF (c,t,n) p-value ADF (c,t,n) p-value
Y -2.893 (c,t,4) 0.169 -4.294 (c,3) 0.001
P -2.707 (c,t,4) 0.236 -1.271 (3) 0.187
CR -2.059 (c,t,1) 0.563 -10.069 (c,1) 0.000
PH -2.346 (c,t,5) 0.405 -4.294 (4) 0.002
PEQ -2.483 (c,t,1) 0.336 -4.294 (c,0) 0.000
E 2.184 (1) 0.993 -4.294 (0) 0.000
RS -2.970 (c,1) 0.041
WT -1.820 (c,t,2) 0.687 -4.261 (c,1) 0.001
PC -2.893 (c,t,4) 0.169
RUS -3.051 (c,5) 0.033
IFO -3.587 (c,1) 0.008
Sample: 1970.1-2000.4. c = intercept, t = trend, n = number of lags (following
the Schwartz-criterium).
5). The interest rates are stationary in the sample 1970.1-2000.4, but non-
stationary in the sample 1978.4-1998.4 (e.g. the German interest rate has a
p-value of 0.139). Next we test for the number of cointegrating vectors. If we
ﬁnd a near to full rank we could follow the Sims et al. (1990) principle and
estimate the model in levels. Both the Trace and the Maximum Eigenvalue
test indicate two co-integrating vectors at the one percent conﬁdence level.
Given the fact that our sample is small we need to use the one percent levels
to test for co-integration (see Cheung and Lai, 1993). This ﬁnding leads us to
use a model in diﬀerences. We use the annual diﬀerence operator: ∆4(x) =
x−x−4. All variables are stationary in this form (results not reported here,
but available upon request), except again for the inﬂation rate (p=0.188).
Proceeding with the model in diﬀerences we loose some information by not
using the levels. We included three exogenous variables in the VAR in
order to capture world economic development: relevant world trade growth
(∆4(WT)), world commodity inﬂation (∆4(PC)), and annual change of the
log of the U.S. short-term interest rate (∆(RUS)). Although Germany is a
large economy, it will be dependent on world developments. Moreover, we
might reduce the so-called price puzzle including a world commodity price
index.
The ordering of the variables is relevant in a Cholesky factorization of
the variance-covariance residual matrix. We assume that shocks to output
are basically driven by supply elements, that prices are rather sticky, credit
largely dependent on output changes and the single asset price, the exchange
rate, endogenous to a large extent. The policy interest rate is assumed to be
16responding to all other variables in the system. Experimenting with the lag
structure we found three lags. It is good to note that the lag-length criteria
did not hint at one speciﬁc lag length due to the ﬂatness of the optimization
surface.
As explained above, there are various ways to represent the analysis of
shocks in a VAR-model:
• one can compute the orthogonalized impulse response functions. This
is the solution oﬀered by Sims (1980) and is labelled the Cholesky
decomposition.
• One can impose theoretical structure on the short-run contemporane-
ous impact and restrict the B0-matrix to an identiﬁed matrix. This
approach is known as the SVAR (see Bernanke, 1986).
• One can impose theoretical structure on the long-run impact of con-
temporaneous shocks. This is the approach proposed by Blanchard
and Quah (1986) and Gali (1992), but criticized by Faust and Leeper
(1997).
• One can impose ’realistic’ shocks by so-called Generalized Impulse Re-
sponse functions (see Pesaran and Shin, 1998). Realistic shocks are
taken from the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the residuals.
Using GIR’s the ordering of the variable in the VAR becomes irrele-
vant.
Inspecting the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals the co-
variance of the interest rate residuals with all other variables are rather
large (especially the exchange rate residuals). This implies that imposing a
structure on the B0-matrix will change the IRF’s. Ideally one would like to
derive restrictions from a fully-ﬂedged macroeconomic system. In practice
however this is done infrequently (Gali, 1992, and Sims and Zha, 1997, being
exceptions). Instead, the more widely used approach is to present commonly
accepted restrictions based on broad classes of models. As a metric of ap-
propriateness one uses the economic plausibility of the dynamic responses
to shocks imposed.
We assume that output is fully determined by supply shocks (as can be
found in Gali, 1992, and Kim and Roubini, 2000). Output does not respond
on any ﬁnancial variable, because in the short-run only technology will have
an impact on production:
Y = α11uY (1)
For inﬂation we assume that output and foreign price developments (e.g.
via oil prices and changes in world economic) activity aﬀect the domestic
price development instantaneously. Inﬂation responds slowly to all other
variables in the model. The latter assumption is also made by e.g. Kim and
17Roubini (2000), where domestic output aﬀects inﬂation contemporaneously.
Financial variables do not have a contemporaneous eﬀect on output.
P = α21uY + α22uP (2)
Credit is assumed to be determined by demand for credit in the short run.
A standard credit demand function is based on transactions and portfolio
motives, here represented by output and the impact of the interest rate.
Demand for credit is mainly based on domestic arguments, so we assume no
contemporaneous inﬂuence of the exchange rate.
CR = α31uY + α33uCR + α35uR (3)
The exchange rate is determined by output and interest rate shocks. Like
Kim and Roubini (2000) we assume that interest rate and exchange rate
shocks should be modelled interactively. We assume that the exchange rate
does not respond to changes in domestic inﬂation instantaneously, since
this information will be transmitted via the interest rate. Domestic output
changes are used as signals of real activity and do have a contemporaneous
impact (see Kim and Roubini, 2000). Domestic credit conditions typically
have no impact on the exchange rate.
E = α41uY + α44uE + α45uR (4)
Finally we assume that the Bundesbank responded to shocks in output,
assets, and inﬂation (via a so-called Taylor rule, see Taylor, 1993):
R = α51uY + α52uP + α53uCR + α54uE + α55uR (5)






















α11 0 0 0 0
α21 α22 0 0 0
α31 0 α33 0 α35
α41 0 0 α44 α45






















Note that the structural model is overidentiﬁed with 1 degree of freedom.
We can accept the overidentiﬁcation using a χ2-test: the p-value is 0.564.
We do not give an interpretation to the parameters of the B0-matrix, since
the estimation itself cannot identify precise values in such a simultaneous
system.
We analyze the results of this model in two ways. First, we calculate
the Impulse-Response Functions to structural shocks. We give the results
in Figure 1. In Figure 1 uY is represented by shock1, uP by shock2, etc.
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Response of RS to Shock5
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 1: Impulse-Response-functions of the 5-variable model
19Table 6: Variance-Decomposition of interest rate residuals (SVAR)
Period Y P CR E RS
1 2.24 9.76 58.64 10.58 18.79
4 22.79 4.82 63.05 4.10 5.24
8 32.05 3.94 57.71 2.96 3.34
12 31.72 6.09 55.93 3.03 3.23
20 31.98 6.82 55.45 2.77 2.98
aﬀects credit, and not output or inﬂation. Credit shocks aﬀect output and
inﬂation. The interest rate responds to shocks in output and credit.
Next we present the Variance-Decomposition of the structural factoriza-
tion for the interest rate shocks: these results shed light on the role of the
variables in monetary policy (see Table 6). We can observe that output and
credit are the crucial factors explaining the interest rate changes. This may
be seen as a surprise, since it is widely accepted that the Bundesbank was
more focused on inﬂation than on output. Apparently, credit takes the role
of the monetary aggregate in describing monetary policy.
5.2 The role of the IFO business climate indicator
One of the basic issues in monetary VAR-models is the role of expectations.
How does the central bank assess inﬂationary conditions and use its mon-
etary policy instruments to correct any undesired developments? Suppose
that, as Bernanke and Mihov (1997) argue, the Bundesbank followed an in-
ﬂation targeting approach. In that case it is likely that it will have used not
only inﬂationary forecasting devices, but also indicators of real economic
activity, like the output gap. Following Taylor (1993) central banks are be-
lieved to respond on output gap and inﬂationary developments (the latter
being more important in the German setting than in e.g. the U.S.). Given
the information lag in (mostly revised) ﬁgures (see Orphanides, 2001) it is
rather unlikely that the GDP-series takes this informational role. As Flaig
and Pl¨ otscher (2001) illustrate, the IFO-indicator does carry an informa-
tional role in describing and predicting the German output gap.
In order to test for the value added of the IFO indicator we switch this
variable for ∆4(Y ) in the base model. We again estimated the Structural
VAR used above. The ﬁt of the model improves (the p-value of the overiden-
tiﬁcation test increases to 0.747). The Impulse-Response Functions resemble
those reported in Figure 1 closely and are not reported here. We conﬁne
ourselves to the Variance-Decompositions in order to assess the role of the
IFO business climate indicator. In Table 7 it can bee seen that the IFO
indicator gets a larger share in the decomposition than real GDP-growth in
the previous model. The role of credit is reduced and inﬂation gets more
20Table 7: Variance-Decomposition of interest rate residuals (SVAR)
Period Y P CR E RS
1 0.05 8.98 62.81 10.70 17.47
4 21.10 6.16 61.96 4.60 6.17
8 43.26 9.18 38.90 5.16 3.50
12 35.92 22.15 32.84 5.86 3.23
20 40.40 20.09 32.78 4.55 2.19
important. This ﬁnding seems to be more plausible. So, although the ﬁt
and the Impulse-Response Functions of this model and the base model are
comparable, the IFO-model should be preferred.
5.3 Extending the model with housing and equity prices
Knowing the properties of the base model we extend the VAR-model with
two additional variables: the house price index PH and the equity price PEQ.
Both housing and equity will aﬀect consumption and investment behaviour
(which we will roughly proxy here by GDP). So we extend our dependent
vector to: [Y,P,CR,PH,PEQ,E,RS]. We treat housing and equity similar
to the asset price included in the model: the exchange rate. The other
model properties remain the same: we use three lags, include the world
commodity price index, the world trade index and the U.S. interest rate
as exogenous variables. Testing for integration of the asset prices leads
to the conclusion that both are stationary after diﬀerencing (see Table 5).
Testing for cointegration reveals two co-integrating vectors at the 1 per
cent conﬁdence level, so we again estimate the model in annual diﬀerences
using the 1978.4-1998.4 sample (skipping the reuniﬁcation period). In the
SVAR we treat the asset prices similar to the exchange rate in the base
model, except for the contemporaneous impact of the housing and equity
prices on real credit. Moreover we assume that housing, equity prices and
the exchange rate are recursively inﬂuenced. This leaves a model with one

































α11 0 0 0 0 0 0
α21 α22 0 0 0
α31 0 α33 0 0 0 α37
α41 0 α43 α44 0 0 α47
α51 0 α53 α54 α55 0 α57
α61 0 0 α64 α65 α66 α67
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Response of RS to Shock4
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 2: Impulse-Response-functions of a housing price shock
We analyze the model again in two ways. First, we plot the impulse-
response functions of the reactions to housing, equity, and interest rate
shocks. Figures 2 to 4 present the responses to these shocks. From the
housing price shock we observe a (non-signiﬁcant) positive impact on output
and the price level. It can also be observed that the interest rate increases,
which reduces credit. The response to an equity price shock is quite diﬀer-
ent. Output and the price level stay rather constant, there is no interest rate
response and credit even increases (probably to ﬁnance equity investment).
Finally, we can clearly observe a contractionary response to an interest rate
shock. If we compare this result with the results of the base model, the
model extended with asset prices clearly gives more stylized results. Espe-
cially house prices suﬀer from an interest rate shock. Overall, there does
not seem to be an equity channel in Germany.
We derive the impact of all structural shocks to unexplained variance
of the monetary policy instrument equation: the short-term interest rate.
Knowing the sources of this unexplained variance might help in deriving
insight into the monetary policy reactions to shocks of various natures. Table
8 gives the contributions of the various shocks to the explanation of interest
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Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Response of RS to Shock7
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 4: Impulse-Response-functions of an interest rate shock
24Table 8: Variance-Decomposition of interest rate residuals (SVAR)
Period Y P CR PH PEQ E RS
1 0.54 5.08 41.06 48.65 0.27 0.92 3.50
4 14.42 2.10 45.53 22.65 7.83 2.67 4.81
8 38.66 1.30 24.08 14.93 9.77 9.46 21.34
12 31.83 2.55 22.54 15.76 9.23 9.75 21.77
20 24.37 3.60 22.72 15.52 9.28 9.33 22.16
Table 9: Variance-Decomposition of interest rate residuals (SVAR) for the
IFO-climate indicator
Period IFO P CR PH PEQ E RS
1 0.96 5.06 44.48 46.91 0.00 0.54 2.03
4 16.45 2.89 49.47 23.20 2.86 2.81 2.30
8 38.87 3.99 22.16 11.62 1.76 10.86 10.73
12 39.51 3.76 20.64 11.72 2.12 11.18 11.07
20 38.63 3.35 18.43 10.35 3.80 10.26 13.17
run housing shock variance is important. In the longer run real GDP and
credit shocks become more relevant. There is no serious evidence that e.g.
inﬂation has a large impact on monetary policy.
5.4 Using the IFO business climate indicator and asset prices
Finally, we combine the use of the IFO-climate indicator and housing and eq-
uity prices. So we again change the annual output growth rate with the IFO-
climate indicator. We use the same structural model as presented above.
The ﬁt of the model improves using the IFO-climate indicator (the test on
overidentiﬁcation gets a p-value of 0.375). The impulse-response functions
of housing, equity prices and interest rate shocks are largely comparable to
the plots presented above. Using the IFO-climate indicator does not change
the alleged role of housing and equity in this respect.
In Table 9 we present the variance-decompositions of the monetary policy
equation using the IFO-climate indicator instead of GDP. Comparing Tables
9 and 8 we observe that the IFO-climate indicator takes a larger fraction to
explain monetary policy shocks than output (as we expect). Housing prices
remain important signalling variables, but equity is typically not.
256 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we analyze the role of the IFO-climate indicator and asset
prices in German monetary policy. The IFO-climate indicator is a forward-
looking indicator of output and should perform better than output itself in
an analysis of monetary policy. Asset prices are believed to contain a large
set of information and monetary policy should therefore include asset price
information. We present a review of the theory of asset price transmission.
Moreover, we illustrate that the German case is interesting to review, espe-
cially in terms of housing. The German housing market is relatively large
compared to housing markets in other economies.
Using Structural Vector AutoRegression models we analyze the role of
the IFO-climate indicator and asset price shocks. First we show that the
IFO indicator contributes to describing monetary policy performed by the
Bundesbank. Generally we ﬁnd that the expected negative impact of an
interest rate shock on output and the CPI is found in the model with asset
price eﬀects (and not so much in the model without). Analyzing housing
and equity shocks reveals that house price shocks have a substantial impact
on monetary responses. Equity price shocks are rather irrelevant in the
German case, which comes as no surprise, given the institutional ordering
of the German ﬁnancial system. These conclusions hold for the model with
GDP and the model with the IFO business climate indicator. Analyzing the
variance decompositions of the various models shows that house prices have
a serious impact on monetary policy. This impact is enforced using the IFO
business climate indicator, which in itself explains more of monetary policy
changes than output.
How should we take account of these results? First of all our results
might contribute to the discussion on the use of instrument rules versus
targeting rules. As Bernanke and Mihov (1997) show it seems that the
Bundesbank used some kind of inﬂation targeting strategy. Our results
basically conﬁrm this view and point at house prices being a crucial variable.
This result weakens the role of Taylor-rules, in which the full attention
is given to output gaps and inﬂation itself in explaining monetary policy
reactions.
Secondly and in line with the previous conclusion, one should have some
concern about the large variety of variables inﬂuencing monetary policy in
terms of the modeling strategy to analyze these eﬀects. One cannot use
a VAR-model of 20 variables over such a short time span. A suggestion
made by Giannone et al. (2002) is to use factor analysis prior to going to
a VAR- model. It is rather unlikely that in a high-dimensional VAR all the
shocks will be independent. So Giannone et al. advocate using the principal
components of all shocks. As we show in the German case, including a
housing variable as one of the key shocks seems to be relevant.
Finally, a future avenue of research would be to analyze the housing
26market more in depth than we do in our reduced form model. Here one can
think of a model in the spirit of Aoki et al. (2002) who present a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model. This type of model could underpin
the structure to identify the shocks in the short run, but also give directions
to identify likely long-run eﬀects.
27Data Appendix
We describe in short the sources of the data. For more information see
Chirinko et al. (2003).
• CR: Bank credit to the private sector. In constant prices of 1990.
IMF, International Financial Statistics. Nominal ﬁgures have been
deﬂated by the private consumption deﬂator P.
• E: Nominal eﬀective exchange rate. Index 1990=100. Exchange rates
from Datastream. Weighted using calculated trade weights of 1990.
• IR
B: Investment in ﬁxed assets of the business sector. In constant
prices of 1990. Calculated as total investment in ﬁxed assets minus
residential investment and government investment. Source: OECD
National Accounts and Quarterly National Accounts. We interpolated
annual data for government investment and residential investment.
• IFO: IFO business climate index. See www.cesifo.de.
• IR
H: Residential investment. In constant prices of 1990. OECD Quar-
terly National Accounts. We interpolated annual data.










B(−1), where we used an annualised depreciation rate δ=0.06.
Starting value derived from the sources of the OECD, ﬂows and stocks
of ﬁxed capital.











H(−1), where we used an annualised depreciation
rate δ = 0.02. Starting value derived from OECD, Flows and stocks
of ﬁxed capital.
• P: Deﬂator private consumption. Index 1990=100. Source: OECD
National Accounts.
• PC: Price of commodities. In own currency, index 1990=100. Pre-
denominated in dollars converted into national currencies using dollar
exchange rates.
• PEQ: Share price index. Index 1990=100. IMF, International Finan-
cial Statistics.
28• PH: Residential property prices. Index 1990=100. Source: Bundes-
bank. Interpolation of annual prices in DEM 1000 of new or existing
good quality ’Reihenhaus’ in West-Germany.
• RS: Three-month deposit interest rate. In percentages. Source: De
Nederlandsche Bank, Quarterly Bulletin.
• RUS: Three-month U.S. deposit interest rate. In percentages. Source:
De Nederlandsche Bank, Quarterly Bulletin.
• WT: Relevant world trade. Volume index 1990=100. Weighted im-
port volumes of 12 other countries in the EUROMON data set, using
calculated trade weights of 1990.
• Y : Gross domestic product. In constant prices of 1990. Source: OECD
National Accounts.
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